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SCOPE OF GOVERNOR'S CALL AS CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATION ON BUSINESS OF SPECIAL SESSION
OF THE LEGISLATURE
I. INTRODUCTION
The years since World War II have been characterized by a
mounting pressure on state legislatures to produce solutions to
difficult problems on a moment's notice. One manifestation of this
increased pressure has been a rise in the frequency of legislative
special sessions called by the governor.1
The fact that states have been forced to turn to this device
with some regularity in recent years makes appropriate the con-
sideration of a state constitutional problem peculiar to the opera-
tion of a special session: the permissible scope of legislative busi-
ness at special sessions.
It is clear that in states having no specific limitation in their
constitutions, the legislature has the same range of powers at a
special session as it has at the regular session.2 But the majority of
states have constitutional provisions3 limiting legislative business
at special sessions to consideration of matters brought to the legis-
1 Not only has the special session been increasingly frequent, but many
states have turned to annual sessions and budget sessions in order to
get their legislative work done. See generally, Zeller, American State
Legislatures (Report of the Committee on American Legislatures, Amer-
ican Political Science Association) 89-93 (1954).
2 1 SUTHERLA D, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 501 (3rd ed. 1943); Woessner
v. Bullock, 176 Ind. 166, 93 N.E. 1057 (1911); State v. Fair, 35 Wash.
127, 76 Pac. 731 (1904).
3 Typical constitutional provisions are those of Pennsylvania ("When
the General Assembly shall be convened in special session, there shall
be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the procla-
mation of the Governor calling such session .... ") and Colorado ('The
Governor may, on extraordinary occasions convene the general assembly,
by proclamation, stating therein the purpose for which it is to assemble;
but at such special session no business shall be transacted other than
that specially named in the proclamation .... ") PA. CONsT. art. 3, §
25; CoLo. CONST. art. IV, § 9.
In a few states legislative action outside the call is permissible
if passed on by a two-thirds majority. ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 76 provides:
"When the legislature shall be convened in special session, there shall
be no legislation upon subjects other than those designated in the
proclamation of the governor calling the session, except by a vote of
two-thirds of each house."
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lature's attention by the governor, either in his proclamation calling
the session or by subsequent special message. 4
The purpose of the provision is basically twofold. First, the
provision embodies the idea that since the special session is often
an unforeseeable occurrence made necessary by a sudden change
in circumstances, the public should be provided with notice of
what subjects will be before the legislature so that interested parties
may present their views.5 Second, since the special session is by
nature an "extraordinary occasion,"6 requiring immediate legisla-
tive action, the provision has the effect of forcing the legislature
to refrain from clogging its channels of business with less important
matters.7 That the purpose of the provision is not merely a matter
of intra-governmental mechanics and is primarily for the protec-
tion of the public is indicated by the fact that subsequent ratification
by the governor of legislative enactments will not validate them if
their content was not a subject included within the original call to
special session.8
Though it may be reasonably obvious that the practical effect9
of the provision should be to restrain the legislature from passing
4 States having a constitutional provision limiting the scope of legislative
business at special sessions to "subjects" or "objects" stated in the call:
ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 76; ALASKA CONST. art. II, § 9; ARIz. CONST. art. 4,
pt. 2, § 3; ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 19; CAL. CONST. art. 5, § 9; COLO. CONST.
art. IV, § 9; FLA. CONsT. art. 4, § 8; GA. CONST. art. V, § 2-3012; IDAHO
CONST. art 4, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. V, § 8; Ky. CONST. § 80; LA. CONST. art.
5, § 14; MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 28; Mo. CONST. art. 3, § 39(7); Miss.
CONST. art. 5, § 121; MONT. CONST. art VII, § 11; NEB. CONST. art. 4, § 8;
NEV. CONST. art. 5, § 9; N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 6; N.Y. CONST. art. 4, § 3;
OHIO CONST. art. III, § 8; OKLA. CoNsT. art. 6, § 7; PA. CONsT. art. 3, § 25;
TENN. CONST. art. 3, § 9; TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 40; UTAH CONST. art. VII,
§ 6; W. VA. CONST. art. VII, § 7; WIS. CONST. art. 4, § 11.
5 Trenton Graded School Dist. v. Board of Educ. of Todd County, 278 Ky.
607, 129 S.W.2d 143 (1939); Jones v. State, 151 Ga. 507, 107 S.E. 765
(1921); "[T~he constitutional provision was designed to protect any
department or division of the Government, but to protect the people
themselves . . . ." Hutcheson, J., dissenting in Shadrick v. Bledsoe, 186
Ga. 345, 198 S.E. 535 (1938); 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
§ 502 (3d ed. 1943).
6 N.Y. CONST. art. 4, § 3 provides: "[The Governor] shall have power to
convene the legislature, or the senate only, on extraordinary occasions."
(Emphasis added).
7 Richmond v. Lay, 261 Ky. 138, 87 S.W.2d 134 (1935); Smith v. Curran,
268 Mich. 366, 256 N.W. 453 (1934).
8 2 Long v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 209, 127 S.W. 208 (1910); Wells v. Missouri
Pac. R.R., 110 Mo. 286, 19 S.W. 530 (1892).
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laws in areas not suggested by the governor, proper application of
the provision to specific cases is not conducive to easy solution.
As in many other areas of constitutional law, the rules in this area
have developed through a process of judicial inclusion and exclu-
sion. But even more so than in other constitutional areas, an ex-
amination of the cases, wherein courts were faced with the question
of whether the subject of a particular piece of legislation was within
the call, reveals a surprising lack of agreement as to what the proper
approach should be.10 Though at least one court has purported to
find in the provision a clearly defined mandate for judicial action,
most have not." Sometimes, of course, there is no doubt that a law
passed was not comprehended by the governor's call. Thus in a case
where the call was for "legislation to provide additional state
revenues" and the legislature passed an act creating a state crime
commission, the court held the act outside the call and uncon-
stitutional.12 Usually, however, the court's task is not so simple.'3
Various canons of construction and general rules of interpre-
tation have been developed to reach, or justify, as the case may
be, conclusions as to the validity of particular enactments under
particular calls. 14 Though these "tests" are by necessity general
in their terms and do not eliminate the necessity for careful analysis
of all the language involved (both in the act and in the call), they
provide some direction. Also, examination of the cases shows two
rather well defined judicial points of view regarding the proper
interpretation of the call. Consideration of these views, together
with the above mentioned canons of construction, or "tests," pro-
vides a foundation upon which most of the cases can be reconciled.
Of course, the reader will be concerned as to the effect of
specific constitutional language on results in a given jurisdiction.
As a rule, differences in terminology are not significant enough
to allow distinctions to be drawn between cases on this basis.
9For a further discussion of the purpose and practical effects of the
provision, see infra, Section VI.
10 "Perusal of the authorities touching upon the legislative prerogative
under calls to special session leads to the conclusion that.., the extreme
cases either way seem to be irreconcilable .... " State Tax Comm'n v.
Preece, 1 Utah 2d 337, 339, 266 P.2d 757, 759 (1954).
" Adams v. Noble, 103 Miss. 393, 60 So. 561 (1913).
12 State v. Schoonover, 124 S.E.2d 340 (W.Va. 1962).
13 State ex rel. Nat'l Conservation Exposition Co. v. Woollen, 128 Tenn.
456, 161 S.W. 1006 (1913).
14 1 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 501-09 (3d ed. 1943).
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Judicial interpretation has rendered such terms as "object," "sub-
ject," "subject-matter," and "general purpose" equivalents. The
terms have been used interchangeably by the courts with decisions
of other jurisdictions being quoted and relied upon without regard
to the wording of the particular constitutional provision involved. 15
II. "TESTS" OF VALIDITY UNDER THE CALL
While in a sense it seems inappropriate to speak of "tests"
when really all that is involved is a judgment as to whether one
subject (or subjects) comprehends another, that word does serve
to characterize the various forms of logic utilized by courts in
determining whether the governor's call has been exceeded. Since
there is virtual unanimity among courts that these tests correctly
represent the law governing the interpretation of the governor's
call, it should suffice at this point to present them with a minimum
of discussion. They should, however, be stored for future reference.
First, to be valid under the call, the legislative enactment must,
under the universal rule, be "germane"'1 or "related to"'17 the call.
Conversely, if the legislative act has no reasonable relevance to
the subject matter proposed by the governor, it is unconstitutional
and void.18 Whether the "germane" tests has been met is of course
entirely dependent upon the facts of the situation.
Second, all courts agree that the call cannot be used by the
governor to inhibit legislative discretion.19 In other words, though
the legislature may be limited in its field of action to the subjects
15 "Comparing [cases from several jurisdictions] we see no substantial
difference in the constitutional limitations upon legislative power. They
all provide that the governor may confine the legislature, called in
special session, to such subjects of legislation as he may prescribe . .. ."
State ex Tel. Nat'l Conservation Exposition Co. v. Woollen, 128 Tenn.
456, 487, 161 S.W. 1006, 1014 (1913).
16 In re Opinion of the Justices, 94 Colo. 215, 29 P.2d 705 (1934); Blackford
v. Judith Basin County, 109 Mont. 578, 98 P.2d 872 (1940); Common-
wealth ex Tel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 Atl. 697 (1932).
'7 Shadrick v. Bledsoe, 186 Ga. 345, 198 S.E. 535 (1938).
18 Smith v. Curran, 268 Mich. 366, 256 N.W. 453 (1934); State ex Tel. Nat'l
Conservation Exposition Co. v. Woollen, 128 Tenn. 456, 161 S.W. 1006
(1913).
19 "All the cases agree that, while the governor may so limit the subjects
of legislation, he cannot dictate to the legislature the special legislation
which they shall enact on those subjects." State ex Tel. Nat'l Conserva-
tion Exposition Co. v. Woollen, 128 Tenn. 456, 487, 161 S.W. 1006, 1014
(1913). See also Blackford v. Judith Basin County, 109 Mont. 578, 98
P.2d 872 (1940); Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 612 (1938);
State Tax Comm'n v. Preece, 1 Utah 2d 337, 266 P.2d 757 (1954).
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submitted, it need not follow the governor's advice as to how a given
subject should be handled.20 Any stipulation made by the gov-
ernor as to what procedure should be followed in dealing with a
subject is advisory only.21 Thus the governor may not, under the
guise of naming a subject, limit its scope so drastically that he in
effect imposes upon the legislature his own view of what policy
should be adopted.22
Third, the general principle is found in nearly all decisions that
the limitation on the scope of the legislature's business should be
construed in favor of legislative power.23 And finally, the legisla-
tive enactment is presumed to be valid and the burden of proof is
on the person attacking the law to show its constitutional defect.24
At this point it becomes apparent why all courts seem to agree
on these tests. Identical fact situations could reach opposite results
with both courts dutifully applying every one of the tests. The
problem is to find a means of expressing, in concrete language, the
relationship between two abstractions (the "subject" designated
in the call and the "subject" of legislative action). Many of the
expressions used seem to lead, at least in a philosophical sense,
20 Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 57, 161 Atl.
697, 703 (1932): "While the legislature must confine itself to the matters
submitted, it need not follow the views of the governor or legislate in
any particular way."
21 McCarroll v. Clyde Collins Liquors, 198 Ark. 896, 132 S.W.2d 19 (1939);
Martin v. Riley, 20 Cal. 2d 28, 123 P.2d 488 (1942); Williams v. MacFeeley,
186 Ga. 145, 197 S.E. 225 (1938); Smith v. Curran, 268 Mich. 366, 256
N.W. 453 (1934); Sweeney v. City of Butte, 64 Mont. 230, 208 Pac. 943
(1922); Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Wolfe, 61 Neb. 502, 86 N.W. 441 (1901);
People ex rel. Buffalo & Fort Erie Pub. Bridge Auth. v. Davis, 277
N.Y. 282, 14 N.E.2d 74 (1938); Ex parte Fulton, 86 Tex. Crim. 149, 215
S.W. 331 (1919); Long v. State, 58 Tex. Crim. 209, 127 S.W. 208 (1910);
State Tax Comm'n v. Preece, 1 Utah 2d 337, 266 P.2d 757 (1954);
State Road Comm'n v. West Va. Bridge Comm'n, 112 W.Va. 514, 166
S.E. 11 (1932).
22 Commonwealth ex rel. Schnader v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35, 161 Atl. 697
(1932). Also see generally cases cited note 21 supra.
231 SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 507 (3d ed. 1943); Board of
Regents of Univ. of Ariz. v. Sullivan, 45 Ariz. 245, 42 P.2d 619 (1935);
State v. Versluis, 58 Ariz. 368, 120 P.2d 410 (1941); City of Edwards-
ville v. Jenkins, 376 Ill. 327, 33 N.E.2d 598 (1941); State v. Smith, 184
La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1935); Adams v. Noble, 103 Miss. 393, 60 So. 561
(1913); In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940); Pittsburg's Peti-
tion, 217 Pa. 227, 66 Atl. 348 (1907); Appeal of Van Dyke, 217 Wis. 528,
259 N.W. 700 (1935).
24 State v. Schoonover, 124 S.E.2d 340 (W.Va. 1962).
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only to questions rather than answers. One asks, "How germane
must the legislature's business be to that proposed by the governor?"
Or, "How closely related to the subject matter in the call must the
legislation be?" One court expressed the matter this way:25
If it be competent for the governor, after the general manner
attempted, to authorize the general assembly to select for itself
the subject-matter of legislation and enact laws accordingly, then
it is equally permissible for him, in his proclamation, to say that the
General Assembly is called in special session 'To enact any and
all legislation relating to or in any wise affecting the qualified
voters of the state, or the taxpayers of the state, or the citizens
of the state,' and thus the door is opened wide for general legislation
at a special session. The sole difference between these suggestions
and the designation which the governor actually did make, is one
of degree; there is absolutely none in character or kind.
That the question is, in the final analysis, one of degree is of course
no more a complete answer than are statements to the effect that
laws passed at special sessions must be "germane" to the call or
"related to" the subject matter proposed. But the observation
that the matter is one of degree does serve to indicate the necessity
for discussion of a few illustrative fact situations in the setting of
the exact constitutional language involved.26 Such a discussion
will show not only that the tests listed above work better in prac-
tice than in theory, but will also illustrate the two divergent views
on the proper interpretation of the call.
III. THE MAJORITY VIEW
A good starting point for analysis of the case law dealing with
the governor's call as a constitutional limitation on legislative power
is an early Colorado case, Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Moss. 2 7 In Moss a
call2 S to special session requested the legislature "To enact any
and all legislation relating to or in any wise affecting corporations,
both foreign and domestic, of a quasi-public nature."2 9 The Colo-
rado General Assembly, meeting pursuant to this call, passed an
act defining the liability of railroads for killing live stock. The
25 Denver & R.G.R.R. v. Moss, 50 Colo. 282, 286, 115 Pac. 696, 697 (1911).
26 As pointed oute arlier, the slight differences in constitutional language
have not had a significant impact on the results of litigation. See note
15 supra. The applicable language will be included, however, as various
cases are discussed.
27 50 Colo. 282, 115 Pac. 696 (1911).
28 The call included a number of subjects but the quoted matter was the
only part deemed by the court to be even arguably relevant to the
legislation attacked as being outside the call.
2950 Colo. 282, 284, 115 Pac. 696, 697 (1911).
COMMENTS
act was adjudged unconstitutional by the Colorado Supreme Court
as outside the governor's call.30 The basic reason for the act's in-
validity was that the call of the governor was too broad. The court
admitted that it was "all too true" that the proclamation was broad
enough to admit the act in question; but in its view the constitution
required the governor to do more than merely open up an area by
designating a class which should be regulated. Rather the gov-
ernor's obligation was to name some "special subject-matter." The
effect of the proclamation in the court's opinion was to leave to
the legislature to determine for itself what the subject of legisla-
tion would be as long as the result was to "affect corporations."
This amount of discretion, the court felt, was not available to the
legislature at a special session.3 1
The meaning of the Moss decision is brought into sharper focus
by comparing it with an earlier Nebraska case involving a some-
what similar fact situation: Chicago B. & Q.R.R. v. Wolfe.32 In Wolfe
the legislature was called into special session to consider "The re-
vision or amendment of the general incorporation law." At that
session a law was passed "defining the duties and liabilities of
railroad companies." This act was found to be within the governor's
call.
The Moss opinion distinguished Wolfe on the ground that the
proclamation of the Nebraska governor "particularly pointed out
and named" the subject of legislation, while the call before it ac-
complished no more than the designation of a class to be subjected
to legislative regulation.3 It is difficult to see what the court was
driving at by this finding that the calls were basically different
because one particularly pointed out a subject while the other did
not. In the one instance (Moss), the governor asked for legislation
30 COLO. CONST. art. IV § 9 provides: "The governor may, on extraordinary
occasions convene the general assembly, by proclamation, stating therein
the purpose for which it is to assemble; but at such special session no
business shall be transacted other than that specially named in the
proclamation."
31 "If the governor may empower the legislature, in the face of the con-
stitution, to enact any and all legislation, by merely pointing out the
person, class or interest to be affected thereby, instead of specially
naming the subject-matter of legislation, then the constitutional pro-
vision is utterly disregarded, and its main and most wholesome and
salutary purpose, that of confining legislation to the specific subject-
matter concerning which an emergency is believed to exist, completely
nullified." 50 Colo. at 286-87, 115 Pac. at 697.
32 61 Neb. 502, 86 N.W. 441 (1901).
33 50 Colo. at 288, 115 Pac. at 698.
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"in any wise affecting corporations." In the other, the subject sub-
mitted was "revision or amendment of the general incorporation
law." Both of these calls presented a general "subject" having to
do with corporations.3 4
The result reached in Moss can be reconciled with that of Wolfe,
however-albeit on a different rationale than used by the court.
The two cases exemplify the liberal (Wolfe) and strict (Moss) views
of the proper function of the governor's call.
The majority or liberal construction of the governor's call
adheres most strongly to the doctrine that the legislative preroga-
tive should be upheld if this can be done through any reasonable
construction of the call.35 Courts of this persuasion have been in-
clined to uphold a legislative act taken at special session if the
governor did so much as mention the subject matter in his call.36
Thus in Shadrick v. Bledsoe37 the call included as objects of
proposed legislation, "taxation and revenue of all kinds, laws per-
taining to contraband or outlawed goods, nuisances, and practices
of professions, businesses, and trades, and penal laws."38 The
legislature passed an act repealing the state's prohibition law and
providing for taxation and sale of liquor under local option. The
court held this act within the call. The test used by the majority
opinion was that the legislation must be "related to" the subjects
set forth in the governor's call.39 Note how broad this decision is.
As pointed out by the dissenting judge, the only possible justifica-
tion for the act under the call was the object of raising revenue.40
But even if it were conceded that the call was broad enough to
34A like view was expressed by Hill J., dissenting in Moss: "[I] am un-
able to appreciate wherein the difference or distinction is to be found
in a call which provides for the revision or amendment of the general
incorporation laws, and one which calls for laws affecting such corpora-
tions.. . ." 50 Colo. at 302, 115 Pac. at 702.
35 In re Platz, 60 Nev. 296, 108 P.2d 858 (1940).
36 Baldwin v. State, 21 Tex. Ct. App. R. 591, 3 S.W. 109 (1886).
37 186 Ga. 345, 198 S.E. 535 (1938).
38 Id. at 345, 198 S.E. at 536.
39 GA. CONST. art. V, § 2-3012 states: "The Governor shall have power to
convoke the General Assembly on extraordinary occasions, but no law
shall be enacted at called sessions of the General Assembly, except such
as shall relate to the objects stated in his proclamation convening
them . .. ."
4 0 Hutcheson, J., dissenting in Shadrick v. Bledsoe, 186 Ga. 345, 198 S.E.
535 (1938).
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include any revenue statute, the law seems to fall outside the range
of topics listed by the governor. The decision certainly represents
the liberal view that mere mention of the general subject matter
in the call is enough. (This is true regardless of the emphasis one
chooses to place on the constitutional language-cited by the court
as more permissive in Georgia than in some states. 41)
The liberal view was likewise followed in the Louisiana case
of State v. Smith.42 The call to special session asked for considera-
tion of, among other matters, "Appointment and election of public
officers." At the session a law was passed dealing not only with
the appointment and election of various officers, but also with
the creation of additional positions for police jurors. The court held
that the power to act on the appointment and election of public
officers included the right to create offices.43
In State Road Comm'n v. West Virginia Bridge Comm'n,44 the
call requested: 45
Revision of salaries paid all public officials now fixed or authorized
by general or special statute. [and for] An emergency revenue
measure to balance the state budget, and to raise an additional
sum of five hundred thousand dollars, or such part thereof as may
be deemed proper, to be applied to the relief of the unemployment
over a specified period . . . such revenue to be raised by indirect
taxation by a special tax on cigarettes and/or other forms of tobacco
and other luxuries, no part of the revenue for such purposes to be
raised by a direct property tax.
The legislature enacted a measure, over the governor's veto, abolish-
ing the West Virginia Bridge Commission and transferring its
function to the state road commission. The court found the act
to be within the call, reasoning that since the "purpose" of the call
was to save money and balance the budget-and since lowering
salaries was only a suggested means to this end-the abolishment
41 See note 39 supra. The majority in Shadrick v. Bledsoe maintained
that the Georgia provision is more liberal than in some states which
require legislative business to be related to objects "specifically" stated
in the call.
42 184 La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1935).
43 LA. CONST. art. 5, § 14 provides: "The power to legislate, under the
penalty of nullity, shall be limited to the objects specially enumerated
in the proclamation of the Governor, or petition and notice, convening
such extraordinary session. .. ."
44 112 W.Va. 514, 166 S.E. 11 (1932).
45Id. at 517, 166 S.E. at 13.
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of an office fit within the call as the legislature's way to save
money.46
In a California case implementing the liberal view, an act
which completely reorganized the California State Guard was held
within a call requesting the legislature to consider "augmenting the
appropriation" for the operation, maintenance and organization of
the State Guard.4 7 The court said that when the governor has sub-
mitted a subject to the legislature, "the designation of that subject
opens for legislative consideration matters relating to, germane
to and having a natural connection with the subject proper.148
Finally, in Baldwin v. State,49 where the call was for legislation
to reduce taxation, and the legislature imposed a new tax on a new
subject, the act was upheld by the court on the theory that the
whole subject of taxation was before the legislature.8 0
Summarizing the lessons to be drawn from these cases, it should
be first reiterated that all courts agree that the legislature may not
pass laws at special sessions which are not "germane" to, "related
to" or "having a rational connection with" subjects stated in the
call.51 Where the disagreement is, and where, it is submitted, there
lies a liberal and narrow view, is in the breadth of construction to
be given the call. The liberal, and the majority, position is repre-
sented by the cases just discussed holding that the mere mention
of a subject in the call opens up that subject entirely. Thus in the
46W. VA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 7 provides: "The Governor may on extra-
ordinary occasions convene, at his own instance, the Legislature; but
when so convened it shall enter upon no business except that stated
in the proclmation by which it was called together."
47 Martin v. Riley, 20 Cal. 2d 28, 123 P.2d 488 (1942).
48Id. at 39, 123 P.2d at 495. The pertinent California constitutional
provision recites that the Governor "may, on extraordinary occasions,
convene the Legislature by proclamation, stating the purposes for which
he has convened it, and when so convened it shall have no power to
legislate on any subjects other than those specificed in the proclama-
tion .... " CAL. CONST. art. 5, § 9.
4921 Tex. Ct. App. R. 591, 3 S.W. 109 (1886).
50 TEX. CONST. art. 3, § 40 provides: "When the Legislature shall be con-
vened in special session, there shall be no legislation upon subjects
other than those designated in the proclamation of the Governor call-
ing such session, or presented to them by the Governor; and no such
session shall be of longer duration than thirty days."
51State Tax Comm'n v. Preece, 1 Utah 2d 337, 266 P.2d 757 (1954); 1
SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 508 (3d ed. 1943).
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Baldwin case, supra, a call to lower taxes would introduce the whole
subject of taxation, and the legislature would be free to raise taxes.r2
IV. THE MINORITY VIEW
The position of a minority of courts taking a narrow or strict
view of the call is that the subject matter amenable to legislative
action must be restricted within the actual confines of the governor's
words. That is, though the governor designates a general subject
in his call, he may restrict the business which the legislature may
properly consider to a specific branch of that general subject.53
The leading case espousing this position is State ex rel. National
Conservation Exposition Co. v. Woollen .5 4 The call there was for
legislation "to make such appropriation of the public moneys as
may be deemed necessary and proper to maintain the state's institu-
52 Other cases representing the majority view are: State Tax Comm'n v.
Preece, 1 Utah 2d 337, 266 P.2d 757 (1954) (Call asked for legislation
in the area of "school retirement and finance" but expressly negatived
any imposition of new or higher taxes. Act was passed allocating more
money to the state school system, to be financed by increasing the
excise tax on cigarettes. Held: within the call); Annenberg v. Roberts,
333 Pa. 203, 2 A.2d 612 (1939) (A call to consider "making illegal the
use of devices or methods of transmission of information or advices in
furtherance of gambling was held to authorize the creation by the
legislature of a commission to investigate gambling in the state. The
court said that the call "inferentially permitted" the legislation); Black-
ford v. Judith Basin County, 109 Mont. 578, 98 P.2d 872 (1940) (A call
of the governor requesting amendment of the law "in relation to the
time for redeeming real estate from tax liens" was held to authorize
an act which did not actually extend the time of redemption from tax
liens, but did afford relief by enabling the former owner to buy back
his property for the amount of the taxes); Long v. State, 58 Tex. Crim.
209, 127 S.W. 208 (1910) (Law changing the terms and times of sessions
of certain state courts was held to be within a call for consideration
of laws "simplifying the procedure in both civil and criminal courts.")
Accord, McCarroll v. Clyde Collins Liquors, Inc., 198 Ark. 896, 132 S.W.2d
19 (1939); People ex rel. Griffin v. City of Chicago, 382 Ill. 500, 48
N.E.2d 329 (1943); People ex rel. Buffalo & Fort Erie Pub. Bridge
Auth. v. Davis, 277 N.Y. 292, 14 N.E.2d 74 (1938); State ex rel. Ach
v. Braden, 125 Ohio St. 307, 181 N.E. 138 (1932); Kemp v. State, 35 Okla.
Crim. 128, 248 Pac. 1116 (1926); Commonwealth v. Liveright, 308 Pa. 35,
161 Atl. 697 (1932); Corn v. Fort, 170 Tenn. 377, 95 S.W.2d 620 (1936);
Bedford Corp. v. Price, 112 W.Va. 674, 166 S.E. 380 (1932).
53 E.g., Sims v. Weldon, 165 Ark. 13, 263 S.W. 42 (1924). The Governor
called special session to act on "the financial distress of the public
schools" asking for more money through an income tax or a severance
tax. The legislature passed an act imposing a tax on cigarettes. The
court found the law void as being outside the call.
54128 Tenn. 456, 161 S.W. 1006 (1913).
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tions, offices and departments."5 The legislature made an appro-
priation to an "exposition company" created for the purpose of
"holding expositions, encouraging and supporting agriculture, in-
dustrial enterprises, and the breeding of live stock." The money
was granted to this private concern under a general appropriation
bill headed "Department of Agriculture." The court held that the
appropriation to the company was invalid as outside the call, stating
that the general authorization to make appropriations of public
moneys was qualified by the words "to maintain the state's institu-
tions, offices and departments" and that the legislature was in-
competent to make appropriations for other than those purposes
stated in the proclamation. 6 The opinion of the majority included
the following statement: 5 7
Many subjects may incidentally be referred to in the executive
messages upon which no action whatever is required; but it will
hardly be claimed that such incidental reference would authorize
legislation upon all such subjects at a special session. The evident
object, it seems to us, is to restrict legislation at such session to
those subjects which the Governor may deem it necessary to legis-
late upon.
A similar position was taken in a Michigan case, Smith v.
Curran.58 In Smith the call asked for legislation validating bonds
issued by a municipality "under sufficient popular vote regardless
of technical requirements." The legislature passed a statute which
permitted validation of bonds issued without legal power, that is
without sufficient popular vote. The court, holding the law uncon-
stitutional 9 as outside the call said: 60
The 'subject' submitted in the message was not wholesale validation
of bonds. It covered only kinds of bonds which form a logical and
natural class for validation, separate and distinct from the other
classes also covered [by the act]. While the Governor, within the
range of a 'subject,' may not restrict the Legislature, he has the
55 Id. at 457, 161 S.W. at 1007.
5 0 TENN. CONST. art. 3 § 9 provides: "He [the Governor] may, on ex-
traordinary occasions, convene the General Assembly by proclamation,
in which he shall state specifically the purposes for which they are to
convene; but they shall enter on no legislative business except that for
which they were specifically called together."
57 128 Tenn. 456, 462, 161 S.W. 1006, 1013 (1913).
58 268 Mich. 366, 256 N.W. 453 (1934).
5 MIicH. CONST. art. IV, § 28 provides: "When the legislature is convened
on extraordinary occasions in special session no bill shall be passed
on any subjects other than those expressly stated in the governor's
proclamation or submitted by special message."
60 268 Mich. 366, 256 N.W. 453, 455 (1934).
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authority to limit the subject according to his conception of the need
for legislation. Thus, a proposal for action upon a certain tax would
not throw open the whole matter of taxation for legislation or a
recommendation as to a crime would not include the entire realm
of criminal law.
There can be little doubt that the court here is saying that the
mere mention of a subject does not open it generally to legislation.0 '
The court in Smith, however, describes its position somewhat dif-
ferently than was done in State ex rel. National Conservation Ex-
position Co. v. Woollen. 2 As the quoted portion of the Smith opinion
shows, the court reasoned that the wholesale validation of bonds
was not really the "subject" submitted by the governor; rather, the
"subject" submitted was validation of bonds "issued under sufficient
popular vote." But saying that the general subject of validating
bonds was not the "subject" submitted actually does no more than
state a result. It certainly cannot be denied that validation of bonds
issued by a municipality was a general subject before the legisla-
ture as a result of the call. The crucial question essentially is
whether effect is to be given to the qualification imposed on that
general subject-that is, whether the legislature may validate only
those bonds issued under "sufficient popular vote." To this question
the Smith court answers yes. In so doing it effectively takes a posi-
tion comparable to that taken in Woollen, namely, that the governor
may qualify a general subject introduced to the legislature.
McClintock v. City of Phoenix63 also illustrates this narrow
view. In McClintock the legislature passed a law at a special session
which purportedly validated proceedings of the city of Phoenix
in voting bonds for the acquisition of an armory for the National
Guard. The governor's call had asked for consideration of "govern-
mental machinery, state, county and municipal, with a view to more
closely coordinating or abolishing certain agencies and activities,
and revising expenditures in connection therewith." The act was
held to be outside the call.64
61 Language used in both Smith v. Curran and State ex rel. National Con-
servation Exposition Co. v. Woollen effectively illustrates the limitations
of the "germane," "related to," or comparable tests. It is useless to
speak of a subject being "germane" to the call unless it first be de-
termined whether the subject must be "germane" to the call as qualified.
62 128 Tenn. 456, 161 S.W. 1006, 1013. (1913)
63 24 Ariz. 155, 207 Pac. 611 (1922).
64 Amiz. CONST. art. 4, pt.2, § 3 recites: "In calling a special session, the
Governor shall specify the subjects to be considered, and at such special
session no laws shall be enacted except such as relate to the subjects
mentioned in the call."
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Once again the court is clearly giving effect to a limitation im-
posed by the governor on the broad subject matter submitted.
The court reasoned that the call to consider "governmental ma-
chinery ... with a view to more closely coordinating, or abolishing
certain agencies and activities, and revising expenditures in con-
nection therewith" did not comprehend the power of a city to issue
or sell bonds "for any purpose whatever."6 5
Summarizing the minority view, these courts impose a strict
construction upon the governor's call to special session in that they
uphold the right of the governor to limit the legislature's agenda
to certain, specific areas within a general subject.6 Thus under
this view a call to consider reduction of taxes would not authorize
the legislature to pass an act raising taxes or imposing a new tax.67
Like the courts adopting the liberal position, however, the minority
decisions recite that laws must be "germane" 68 to or "related to"69
the call, that the governor may not dictate policy to the legislative
branch°7 0 and that legislative enactments are presumptively valid.71
V. A CURRENT NEBRASKA PROBLEM
As previously indicated, the task of deciding whether a par-
ticular piece of legislation is within a particular call-involving
as it does the determination of whether one abstraction is relevant
to another-is not easy. This is particularly true if the only guides
available are the constitutional provision itself and the general
notion that the legislation must be "germane" to the call. Specific
case precedent is not much help in this area because of the difficulty
in finding a prior case where both the legislative act and the call
were similar to the ones being construed. There is, of course, prece-
dent in principle, and this is where the two views of the call become
relevant. That the use of these views can be of substantial assistance
in analyzing the relationship between the call and the subsequent
65 24 Ariz. 155, 156, 207 Pac. 611, 613 (1922).
66 State v. Pugh, 31 Ariz. 317, 252 Pac. 1018 (1927); In re Opinion of
the Justices, 94 Colo. 215, 29 P.2d 705 (1934); State v. Adams, 323 Mo.
729, 19 S.W.2d 671 (1929); State ex rel. Carpenter v. City of St. Louis,
318 Mo. 870, 2 S.W.2d 713 (1928); Wells v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 110 Mo. 286,
19 S.W. 530 (1892).
67 Contra, Baldwin v. State, 21 Tex. Ct. App. R. 591, 3 S.W. 109 (1886).
68 State ex rel. National Conservation Exposition Co. v. Woollen, 128 Tenn.
456, 161 S.W. 1006 (1913).
69 McClintock v. City of Phoenix, 24 Ariz. 155, 207 Pac. 611 (1922).
70 Smith v. Curran, 268 Mich. 366, 256 N.W. 453 (1934).
71 Ibid.
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legislation under it is well documented by a current Nebraska
problem arising from the following facts.
The Nebraska Legislature, in its regular biennial session in
1963, passed a measure known as Legislative Bill 21,72 which, among
other things provided for the licensing of nonprofit corporations
selling alcoholic liquors for consumption on the premises, and for
the licensing of "bottle clubs" by the State Liquor Commission. 73
The salient sections of L.B. 21, for present purposes, are those
defining "bottle club" and setting their operating procedure, and
those defining "nonprofit corporation." 74
Shortly after the termination of the legislature's regular session,
the Governor called the body into extraordinary session.75 Even
the most cursory reading of the Governor's call, together with his
72 Eessentially the controversy involves two legislative acts: L.B. 21, passed
at the regular 1963 session of the Nebraska Legislature, and L.B. 23,
passed at a subsequent session. Both of these bills amended NEB. REV.
STAT. § 53-103. (Supp. 1961) and NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-179 (Reissue 1960).
The critical effect here, however, is the change made by the two bills in
subdivisions (21) and (22) of NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-103 (Supp. 1961).
For brevity and clarity, the two acts will be referred to as L.B. 21 (21)
and (22) and L.B. 23 (21) and (22).
73 L.B. 21, 73rd Neb. Leg. Sess. (1963): "An Act . . . to define terms: to
provide for the licensing of nonprofit corporations for the sale of
alcoholic liquors for consumption on the premises; to provide for the
licensing of bottle clubs; to provide fees; to provide procedures; to pro-
vide exceptions; to authorize the issuance of such licenses outside the
limits of any incorporated city or village; to provide to whom liquor
may be sold or served under such licenses; to permit the sale or dis-
pensing of alcoholic liquor on Sunday under such licenses; to make cer-
tain acts unlawful; to provide penalties ......
74 Subdivision (21) under L.B. 21 provided: "Nonprofit corporation shall
mean a corporation, whether located within any incorporated city or
village or not, organized under the laws of this state, not for profit, and
which has been exempted from the payment of federal income taxes, as
provided by section 501(c) (7) and (8), Internal Revenue Code of 1954."
Subdivision (22) read (under L.B. 21): "The words bottle club shall
mean an operation, whether formally organized as a club having a
regular membership list, dues, officers, and meetings or not, keeping and
maintaining premises where persons who have made their own purchases
of alcoholic liquors congregate for the express purpose of consuming
such alcoholic liquors upon the payment of a fee or other consideration,
including among other services the sale of foods, ice, mixes, or other
fluids for alcoholic drinks and the maintenance of space for the storage
of alcoholic liquors belonging to such persons and facilities for the
dispensing of such liquors through a locker system, card system, or any
other system." L.B. 21, 73rd Neb. Leg. Sess. (1963).
75The Seventy-fourth (Extraordinary) Session of the Nebraska Legis-
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message to the legislature at the outset of the session, reveals that
the primary purpose for the extra session was to do something
about the problems created by the court's invalidation of statutes
fixing interest rates for installment sales.76 The call, however, asked
for consideration of a number of other matters. Among these, only
one, item six in the call, is relevant for purposes here.77 In item
six the Governor asked for an amendment to L.B. 21, subdivision
(21) defining nonprofit corporations eligible for licensing for the
sale of alcholic liquors for consumption on the premises.78 It was
the Governor's opinion that the failure of subdivision (21) to in-
clude veterans' organizations among those nonprofit groups eligible
for licensing had been an oversight and resulted in discrimination.7 9
At the special session the legislature made the change requested
by the Governor in subdivision (21) 80 but also made sweeping
changes in the operating procedure of bottle clubs described in sub-
division (22),81 tightening considerably the rules applicable to such
clubs.
lature convened pursuant to proclamation by the Governor on October
21, 1963. Neb. Legis. Journal, 74th (Extraordinary) Sess., p. 1.
76 Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963). The Governor
remarked in his message to the legislature that "the primary purpose
for this Call of the Legislature was to consider problems growing out
of interest rates statutes invalidated by the Supreme Court of this
state." Neb. Legis. Journal, 74th (Extraordinary) Sess., p.7 .
77 The entire text of the call may be found at pages 2-4 of the Neb.
Legis. Journal, 74th (Extraordinary) Sess.
78 The Governor's proclamation requested the Legislature to "amend sub-
division (21) of section 53-103, Revised Statutes Supplement, 1961, as
amended by section 1, Legislative Bill 21, Seventy-third Session, Ne-
braska State Legislature, 1963, by including those nonprofit corporations
which have been exempted from the payment of federal income taxes,
as provided by section 501(c) (4), Internal Revenue Code of 1954, within
the definition of a nonprofit corporation, thus redefining nonprofit
corporations eligible for licensing for the sale of alcoholic liquors for
consumption on the premises to include the above described corpora-
tion.s" Neb Legis. Journal, supra, at 3.
79 The Governor, in his message, said, 'With reference to Legislative Bill
21 of your last session-many of us personally disagree with this law
but in view of the fact that it was passed by this body and it is the law
of this state, we should not condone meaningless discrimination in the
bill as now written. The omission of veterans' organizations as those
eligible for consideration as non-profit organizations is an obvious over-
sight and results in discrimination and, in my opinion, we have an obli-
gation to correct what was, obviously, an oversight at the time the bill
was enacted into law." Neb. Legis. Journal, supra, at 6.
80L.B. 8, 74th Neb. Leg. Sess. (Extraordinary) (1963).
S1L.B. 23, 74th Neb. Leg. Sess. (Extraordinary) (1963), changed sub-
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The general question raised by these facts is whether the
legislature's act in revamping the bottle club law is valid under
the call.82 More specifically, the issue presented is whether the
Governor's request that one section of L.B. 21 be amended threw
open all of L.B. 21 for legislative action. Clearly the Governor did
not specifically call for any change in the bottle club provisions
of L.B. 21, subdivision (22). He asked only for change in sub-
division (21) defining nonprofit corporations eligible to serve
liquor on the premises. But L.B. 23 (passed at the special session)
not only made the minor change sought in (21) but also made
broad changes in (22) -substantially rewriting the bottle club law.
First, an attempt must be made to define the subject matter
contained in item six of the call.8 3 Considered narrowly, the "sub-
ject" of item six comprehended no more than an amendment to L.B.
21 to include veterans' organizations. But looking at the item from
the wider angle, it is equally logical to assert that the real "subject"
presented was L.B. 21 in its totality as limited by the suggested
amendment thereto. Acceptance of the latter view of the "subject"
necessitates a choice between the majority and minority positions-
as the result would arguably be different depending upon which
division (22) to read as follows: 'The words bottle club shall mean an
operation, organized as a club having a membership committee and a
regular membership list, keeping and maintaining premises where per-
sons who have made their own purchases of alcoholic liquors con-
gregate for the express purpose of consuming such alcoholic liquors
upon the payment of a fee or other consideration, including among other
services the sale of foods, ice, mixes, or other fluids for alcoholic drinks
and the maintenance of space for the storage of alcoholic liquors be-
longing to such persons and facilities for the dispensing of such liquors
through a locker system or card system; Provided, that no person shall
be a member of a club until at least five days after submitting his name
for membership. Such operation may be conducted by a club as de-
fined in subsection (19) of this section, an individual, partnership, or
corporation; as an incident to the operation an accurate and current
membership list must be maintained at all times which contains the
names and residences of its members, and copies thereof must be filed
with the local governing body annually on May 1 and kept available for
inspection by duly authorized law enforcement officers and representa-
tives of the Liquor Control Commission. Such club premises shall not
be open to the public and shall be available only to club members and
their guests." Compare with text of first law, supra note 74.
82 NEB. CONST. art. 4, § 8 provides: "The Governor may, on extraordinary
occasions, convene the legislature by proclamation, stating therein the
purpose for which they are convened, and the legislature shall enter
upon no business except that for which they were called together."
83 See note 79 supra.
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was applied. The change in the bottle club provision was certainly
"germane" or "related to" the general subject represented by L.B. 21.
On the other hand, if as under the minority decisions the language
limiting consideration of L.B. 21 to amendment of the designated
section is made determinative, the change in the bottle club pro-
vision was not "germane" to the call.
Under the majority view it is sufficient that the act be "ger-
mane" to the general subject even though that subject be specifi-
cally limited.8 4 Here the act was germane to the general subject.
Thus, the argument would go, L.B. 23 should be upheld even though
arguably not "germane" to the specific provision of L.B. 21 desig-
nated by the governor for amendment. Compare, for example, the
cases of Baldwin v. State8 5 and Martin v. Riley 6 with the instant
controversy.8 7 In Baldwin, it will be recalled, the general subject
of the call was taxation, with the limitation on the legislature
being that it should consider a reduction of taxes. Instead the
legislature raised taxes. In Martin the call generally concerned
the State Guard, but this subject was limited by the governor to
"augmenting the appropriation" for operation of the Guard. The
legislative act having been upheld in both of these cases, they are
sound authority on principle for upholding the act in the instant case
where the general subject (L.B. 21) was qualified to include only
subdivision (21), even though the legislature went farther and
rewrote subdivision (22).88
Under the minority view the fact that the legislative enact-
ment is germane to some general object in the call does not settle
the matter.8 9 The governor may limit the legislature to considera-
tion of a particular branch of the general subject.90 Compare the
case of Smith v. Curran9' where the call asked for legislation
validating bonds issued "under sufficient popular vote" and the
legislature passed an act permitting wholesale validation of bonds,
84 Shadrick v. Bledsoe, 186 Ga. 345, 198 S.E. 535 (1938); State v. Smith, 184
La. 263, 166 So. 72 (1935); State Road Comm'n v. West V. Bridge
Comm'n, 112 W.Va. 514, 166 S.E. 11 (1932).
85 21 Tex. App. 591, 3 S.W. 107 (1886).
8620 Cal. 2d 28, 123 P.2d 488 (1942).
87 See page 613 supra.
88 For the pertinent constitutional provisions see notes 83, 50 and 48 supra.
89 State ex rel. Nat'l Conservation Exposition Co. v. Woolen, 128 Tenn. 456,
161 S.W. 1006 (1913).
90 Ibid.
91268 Mich. 366, 256 N.W. 453 (1934).
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ignoring the limitation imposed by the governor. 2 The legislative
act having been declared invalid and the specific limitation upheld
in Smith, the case is authority for the proposition that the Nebraska
Legislature exceeded the call when it changed the bottle club pro-
visions of L.B. 21.
As the bottle club example demonstrates, analysis of the Gov-
ernor's call in terms of the liberal and strict views greatly facilitates
solution of the actual case involving a particular enactment under
a particular call. Of course application of one or the other of the
views can not end judicial inquiry. Such a mechanical approach
would obviously be inappropriate in interpreting a constitutional
provision which is general in its terms.
There is good reason to believe that the result of the bottle
club problem might, under Nebraska law, be an affirmation of the
legislative enactment-that is, a finding that the act was within
the call. There is no peculiarity in the wording of the Nebraska
constitutional provision which would necessitate a different result.93
Nebraska precedent, scant though it is, indicates an inclination
to follow the majority view.9 4 Thus in Chicago B & Q.R.R. v. Wolfe05
discussed earlier,96 the Nebraska court found that a call to consider
"the revision or amendment of the general incorporation law"
authorized the legislature's passage of an act "defining the duties
and liabilities of railroad companies." Though the case did not
involve the problem of deciding whether to give effect to a specific
limitation on a general subject mentioned in the call, the opinion
contains broad language to the effect that mention of a general
subject is sufficient authorization for any legislation germane there-
to, and that the general subject should be given a wide interpre-
tation.9 7
VI. SHOULD LEGISLATURES BE LIMITED AT ALL DURING
SPECIAL SESSIONS-A LOOK AT THE "PROS" AND "CONS"
As indicated at the outset, only slightly more than half of the
states limit their legislatures at special sessions to subjects desig-
92 Smith v. Curran is discussed at page 616 supra.
93 See note 82 supra.
94 Only one Nebraska case is of much value for its analysis of the area,
that being Chicago B. & Q. R.R. v. Wolfe, 61 Neb. 502, 86 N.W. 441 (1901);
see generally State v. Strain, 152 Neb. 763, 42 N.W.2d 796 (1950); People
ex rel. Tennant v. Parker, 3 Neb. 409 (1872).
95 61 Neb. 502, 86 N.W. 441 (1901).
96 See page 611 supra.
97 61 Neb. at 503, 86 N.W. at 442.
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nated by the governor in his call.98 There is much validity in the
argument that the states having no such provision have adopted
the wiser policy.99 The provisions in many state constitutions were
inserted at a time when there was a pervasive fear that a legislature
left to its own devices would impose upon the populace a freedom-
snatching assortment of unwanted laws. 100 Thus various kinds of
procedural checks were cemented into constitutions-of which the
limitation on business at special sessions is only one.1 1 Such a
fear of too much legislation does not seem warranted by the facts
of state governmental life today. If anything, there is now a fear
that the state legislatures are not doing enough and that there has
been an unhealthy increase in centralized power at the federal
level. 0 2
A. THE NATURE OF THE "NOTICE" FUNCTION OF THE CALL
The dominant purpose of the provision limiting the scope of
business at special sessions manifestly is to insure public receipt of
reasonable notice of matters under legislative consideration. This
is the purpose courts try to effectuate in their decisions. 0 3 And
this is the purpose which is of primary concern in considering the
worth of the provision.
The "notice" function of the provision can be most profitably
discussed with reference to its limitations. Under this analysis the
98 See text accompanying note 4 supra.
9 An American Political Science Association report took the position
that legislative business should not be limited at special sessions but
that "the call for special session should be authorized by the governor
or by petition of a majority of the legislators, and these special sessions
should be permitted to transact any public business whether mentioned
in the call or not." AMERICAN POL. Sci. Ass'N Commvl. ON AMERICAN
LEGISLATURES, AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES 109 (Zeller ed. 1954).
100 See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, Table of Effective Dates of State
Constitutions in BooK OF THE STATES (1958-59).
101 See AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 99.
102 Expression of this fear has come from many quarters. E.g., PUBLIC AD-
MINISTRATION SERVICE, MAJOR PROBLEMS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RE-
VISION (Graves ed. 1960). In the forward to this work the editor quotes
Elihu Root's statement that "it is useless for the advocates of state
rights to inveigh against the supremacy of the constitutional laws of
the United States or against the existence of national authority in the
field of necessary control where the States themselves fail in the per-
formance of their duty."
103 State Tax Comm'n v. Preece, 1 Utah 2d 337, 266 P.2d 757 (1954); State v.
Woolen, 128 Tenn. 456, 161 S.W. 1006 (1913).
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public interest in notice of pending legislation is revealed as a rather
weak justification for limiting legislative business.
First, little reason exists for placing the interest of the public
in knowing what its legislators are doing at a special session on a
higher plane than public interest in legislative progress at regular
sessions-at least in this age of instant communication. The interest
of the citizen in legislative business is not like that of a stockholder
of a corporation. The law protects the stockholder's interest by
requiring both the "call" by the board of directors and the notice
given to stockholders of a special stockholders' meeting to state
the specific object or general nature of the business to be trans-
acted. 04 The stockholder has a specifically defined property in-
terest, measured by the value of his stock, in the corporate busi-
ness while the person to be affected by legislative business has only
the interest common to all people in the state.
Furthermore, the notice afforded by the governor's call is dif-
ferent from that rendered by the common constitutional provision
requiring the "subjects" or "objects" of legislative acts to be ex-
pressed in their titles.105 The evils sought to be eliminated by
requiring expression of subject in the title of a bill are well known.
"Log-rolling" was a favorite practice in the early legislative history
of most states,00 with vital rights being affected by legislative
acts whose contents were totally irrelevant to their titles.107
Even though expression of the subject of a law in its title may
serve a necessary function in providing notice of the law's contents,
it remains that "notice" in this area plays a different role than the
"notice" provided in the call. There is no evading the fact that the
function of notice in the title of a law is the rather specialized one
of preventing the public from being misled and by particular legis-
lative acts, and of preventing the passage of unwise measures by a
combination of interests each concerned with only one part of the
law. The notice provided by the governor's call, on the other hand,
serves no such curative function. Rather, the awards of notice in
104 BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 171 (2d ed. 1946).
105 Typical is the Nebraska provision which provides that "No bill shall
contain more than one subject, and the same shall be clearly expressed
in the title." NEB. CONST. art. III, § 14.
100 See PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION SERVICE, MAJOR PROBLEMS IN CONSTITUTIONAL
REvisiox, supra note 102.
107 A discussion of this problem together with several examples may be
found in the opinion of the court in State ex rel. Olson v. Erickson, 125
Minn. 238, 146 N.W. 364 (1914).
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the call are highly speculative in view of the generality of the
usual call and the refinement of today's information sources.
B. PRACTICAL ADVANTAGES OF LIMITING THE LEGISLATURE TO THE
SCOPE OF THE CALL
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of arguments that the
notice aspect of the call is insufficient justification for limiting
the scope of legislative business, the limitation can be defended.
There are certain practical considerations indicating that the limita-
tion may have some salutary effects.
First, despite the pressure on legislative assemblies to take on
more responsibility, and the necessity for governmental regulation
in previously untouched areas, the idea still persists that our politi-
cal system basically involves limited government.0 8 State con-
stitutions are replete with evidence of this theory. Among the
most fundamental of these, of course, is the proposition that -govern-
ment has only certain specifically delegated powers, with all other
authority resting in the hands of the people.'0 9 Other provisions-
for example, the limitation on length of sessions" 0 and frequency
of sessions"-support the notion that the legislators have the
limited duty to pass necessary laws at certain times and go home.
The fact that most legislatures still convene biennially is further evi-
dence of the idea that the legislative process should be used spar-
ingly.12
Secondly, it would seem that the argument for keeping the
legislature within the call is more reasonable in the minority of
states which allow their legislatures to call themselves into
session." 3 The governor is ordinarily limited in his discretion to
call a special session to those circumstances where in his judgment
an emergency of some kind exists." 4 Though his judgment as to
10s See AMERICAN STATE LEGISLATURES 109 (Zeller ed. 1954).
109 E.g., NEB. CONST. art. 1, § 26.
"
0 NEB. CONST. art. IV, § 8.
"1 NEB. CoNsT. art. III, § 10.
112 Ibid.
113 Several states now have provision for the legislature's calling itself into
special session. Typically this is done through petition of two-thirds of
the members. See ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 76.
114 E.g., Miss. CoNsT. art. 5, § 121 provides that the governor may call a
special session "whenever in his judgment, the public interest requires
it."
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whether conditions do in fact justify a special session is generally
not reviewable, 15 it cannot be presumed that there is not some
pressing business that the legislature should discharge with maxi-
mum efficiency and speed. The legislature should not be allowed
to ignore the governor's advice that an emergency situation exists
while tending to problems submitted by its members even though
eventual policy determinations are entirely an affair of the lawmak-
ing body. If the legislature may convene itself, perhaps it should
be forced to do so if there are problems the members feel need
solution, but which are secondary in importance to those submitted
by the governor.
Third, and finally, the limitation of business at special sessions
tends to enable legislators to operate more freely and efficiently.
An elected representative, if he desires re-election, pays heed to
the wishes of his constituents during special sessions as well as
regular sessions. This means that he must deal with special interest
groups who want certain legislation introduced. If the legislature
were not limited to the subjects mentioned in the call, the con-
scientious legislator would be subjected to great pressure during
a special session. He would be forced either to say no to a powerful
constituent who is not likely to be understanding, or to introduce
a measure which stands a poor chance of receiving proper con-
sideration and which may divert the legislature's attention from
more critical matters. The call provides a ready answer to the
legislator's dilemma ("The constitution says I cannot introduce
your bill at this session."), and at the same time protects the legis-
lature from itself by precluding the mass introduction of bills in a
session severely pressed for time and supposedly devoted to a spe-
cial purpose.
CONCLUSION
Even if it be concluded that the practical advantages of limiting
the business of the legislature at special session do not justify the
constitutional provision there is probably little possibility that con-
stitutions will be revised to eliminate the provision. There is cer-
tainly no "groundswell" movement afoot among the people to re-
move restrictions on business at special sessions. Most of the objec-
tions have come from theoreticians.""
115 Smith v. Curran, 268 Mich. 366, 256 N.W.453 (1934).
116 See note 100 supra.
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The best answer probably is that promulgated by the majority
of courts which adopt a very liberal construction of the call. Their
position operates as a suitable adjustment between having no
limitation at all and unduly hamstringing the legislative body.
It is unquestionable that constitutional mandates should not be
taken lightly. The provision should not be stretched beyond reason,
thereby destroying the purpose intended for it by the framers. But
application of the liberal approach to the call is not likely to abro-
gate this purpose, nor is it likely to cause any diminution in the
rights of the people.
John E. Musselman '65
